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Due to the implementation of policies by the WTO and as a result of the GATT, tariff 
barriers become less important instruments for protecting domestic industry. Some non-tariff 
barriers have emerged as substitutes to protect domestic industries. In this paper, we endogenize 
technology choice, allowing domestic firms to select different levels of technology with respect to 
tariff or quota protection. We then find that the equivalence of tariffs and quotas do not exist. We 
are also able to pinpoint which type of trade protection is most effective in bringing about the 





Theoretically, it has been proved already that free trade promotes the efficiency and 
the social welfare of a country. However, such a practice is still not adopted or executed in 
most  countries. Though tariffs have up to the present descended markedly  due to the 
continuous implementation of the GATT established in 1948 and as a result of its successor, 
the WTO, founded in 1995, there is still no way to make all the countries to remove entirely 
their tariff barriers. Meanwhile, abundant of researches have shown that non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) are on an increasing trend ( see also Reitzes and Grawe (1994), Palivos and Yip 
(1995)),  in which quota policies, esp.  the volume quotas  are relatively a commonplace. 
However, in recent years, market share, which is also referred to as ratio quotas, is found to 
have been used as a trade-protecting tool in some cases. For example, in 1983 the United 
Steelworkers of America and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation ever brought forward bilateral 
negotiations with some major steel import countries to restrict the market share of the carbon 
and alloy steel imported at 18.5%. Later, such a mode was also adopted in the semiconductor 
agreement between the USA and Japan (Reitzes and Grawe (l994)). The function of tariffs is 
to raise the cost of imported goods, but NTBs influence the import volume.  The  price 
equivalence of tariffs and quotas has been attended by many experts and scholars in the past 
30 years.   
Bhagwati (1965) was the first to doubt the equivalence of tariffs and quotas. He 
believed that the price equivalence would be tenable only if perfect competition existed both 
at home and at markets abroad. While, Shibata (1968) believed that the price equivalence 
was still tenable only if perfect competition existed in domestic markets, no matter what 
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form the foreign firm might be. In addition, Sweeney, Tower and Willett (1977) stated that if 
the market share quotas c an make  the  domestic firm become  a  monopoly, then price 
equivalence is also held. Itoh and Ono (1982) utilized the Bertrand competition  model to 
analyze the problem of price equivalence. Hwang and Mai (1988) deal with the cases of 
duopoly of homogeneous goods, which took a conjectural variation to analyze  the price 
equivalence issue. They found that if  firms competed  with each other  in the manner of 
Cournot, then the proposition of price equivalence could be established. Contrarily, if they 
compete more monopolistically than Cournot case, the price under tariffs will be higher than 
under quotas. Others authors who also take the conjectural variation method are Tasi and 
Chen (1994). They deemed that if the quota  is binding, the equivalence  is completely 
dependent on the types of the conjectural variation of domestic manufacturers. Otherwise, 
some scholars, such as Krishna (1989) and Dockner and Haug (1990), take various game 
theory to analyze this problem. Some authors such as Mullin (1993) and Ohta (1991) take 
monetary factors into consideration to discuss whether the price equivalence can be realized 
under a dual exchange market. Cunha and Santos (1996) stated that monopolist may use its 
preemption to buy the quota license to invalidate the quota, thus to affect the setting up of the 
price equivalence. Above-mentioned references pay most attention to the short run, i.e., 
suppose that the technical level of industries will not be improved by those trade-protecting 
policies. 
For many countries, however, tariffs and quotas are  expected to do the task  of 
upgrading domestic industries. For instance, to protect the domestic infant industries, many 
developing countries will take the tariffs and quotas policies, the purpose of which is through 
these  trade-protecting policies to upgrade the technical level of domestic  firms and to 
strengthen their competitive advantages. So there have been many papers that have discussed 
the effects of tariffs and quotas on the increase of the technical level of domestic firms, for 
example, Reitzes (1991) analyzed the impact on R&D of tariffs and quotas. In addition, 
Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) studied which of  the two policies c ould  upgrade  a firm’s 
technology level first. The focus of these papers lies on the comparison of the technical 
progressive effects caused by tariffs and quotas, respectively. 
Based on the above discussions, we believe that to get a complete picture of the price 
equivalence problem, one must consider the motives behind the protecting-policies. The 
main purpose of this paper is to verify whether the price equivalence still holds or not when 
technological condition is determined endogenously. Furthermore, the paper compares the 
effects of various protection policies on technologies.   
In this paper, we will discuss three popular quotas policies: volume quotas, market 
share quotas and value quotas, among which the volume quota is the most common. In the 
market share quotas,  the quantitative limit on foreign sales is increasing with respect to 
domestic output. The value quota limits the total amount of import sales in domestic markets. 
Under the policies of market share quota and value quota, domestic firms can exert 
influences on the volume of imports through adjusting the production of their own. 
The next section of the paper involves the setting of the basic model, which takes the 
Cournot model of duopoly in which two firms compete in terms of quantity produced. The 
third section discusses whether the price equivalence between tariffs and quotas still hold 
when the technology choice is endogenous. A comparison with previous references is also CHEN: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS 
  57 
given in this part. The fourth section compares the effects on technologies of the f our 
protection policies, including the tariffs, the volume quotas, the market share quotas and the 
value quotas, respectively. In the last section some conclusions are drawn. 
 
II. The Model 
 
Firstly, suppose that in an open economic system there are one domestic and one 
foreign firm competing in a Cournot duopoly game, whose production is 
h q  and 
f q  
respectively, and with constant marginal cost 
h c   and 
f c  are the same as their corresponding 
average costs, separately. Before production and competition in the market, the domestic 
firm will choose a technology level, which can be represented with the magnitude of 
marginal cost. The smaller the marginal cost is, the better the technology choice is. Next, 
suppose that the technology choice of the foreign firm will not vary with that of the domestic 
firm. The cost of achieving the technology level chosen by the domestic firm is represented 
by T. For the convenience of analysis, this paper adopts the setting mode similar to that of 
Degraba (1990) and Choi (1995), that is we put T = T(
h c ) and  0 '< T ,  0 > ¢ ¢ T , which state 
that the higher technology level does the firm try to obtain, the higher input cost it has to pay 
at an increasing rate. 
Based on these assumptions, we use a two-stage Cournot duopoly model with one 
domestic firm and foreign firm. In the first-stage, the domestic firm will determine an 
optimal technology level against  different protection policies. In the second-stage, the 
domestic firm will carry out a production with the technology level chosen in the first-stage 
and will compete in the domestic market with the foreign firm. We use the general backward 
induction to solve this model and obtain the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
III. The Price Equivalence between Tariff and Non-Tariffs Protection Policies 
 
Since tariffs increase the costs for foreign suppliers, and quotas tend to restrict the 
quantity of foreign-supplied goods in domestic markets, both can cause an increase in price 
in domestic market. However, these two policies may induce different price changes in 
domestic market. To illustrate this, we examine the following analytical framework. First, 
the domestic firm chooses the optimal technology level to maximize its profits under tariffs, 
and therefore result in optimal output of both home and foreign firms. Next, we discussed the 
price equivalence of tariffs and quotas. To make this comparison effectively,  we use the 
quantity obtained under tariff to be the limitation of quotas. This concept is considered in 




Suppose that both the domestic and the foreign firms conduct a Cournot competition. 
The firms produce perfect substitutes, then the inverse demand function of domestic market 
is  ) (
f h q q p p + = . If the government levies a tax  t on foreign-supplied goods by volume, 
then the profit functions of both the firms can be given respectively as: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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) ( ) ( ) , (
h h h f h h c T q c p q q - - = p ,                                         (1) 
 
f f f h f q t c p q q ) ( ) , ( - - = p .                                              (2) 
 
If taking the backward induction, then the first order conditions for the two firms are: 
 
0 ~ ) ( ) , ( 1 = ¢ + - = p q c p q q
h h f h h p ,                                          (3) 
 
0 ~ ) ( ) , ( 1 = ¢ + - - = p q t c p q q
f f f h f p ,                                     (4) 
 
where the firms choose the optimal outputs to maximize their profits respectively. Suppose 
that both the second order conditions 0 11<
h p and , 0 22 <
f p   and stability 0 21 12 22 11 > - =
f h f h D p p p p  
are satisfied so that the global uniqueness of the equilibrium exists. Then Equations (3) and 
(4) can be used to obtain the equilibrium of solution of  ) , ( ~ ~ t c q q
h h h = and  ), , ( ~ ~ t c q q
h f f =  
both of which are the functions of the domestic technology level and the tariff. In addition, 
by totally differentiating the first order conditions, the effect on the outputs by varying from 
the technology level of both the countries can be obtained.
1 In which  0 ~ <
h
c q , which states 
that the domestic output will go up with the progress of the domestic firm’s technologies; 
0 ~ >
f
c q  represents that the import volume will reduce with the progress of the domestic firm’s 
technologies. Meanwhile, the profit function can be rewritten as  ) ), , ( ~ ), , ( ~ ( ~ h h f h h c t c q t c q = p . 
Prior to the first stage, the domestic firm will choose the optimal technology level to 
maximize its profit with the first order condition being: 
 
0 ) ~ ( ~ ) ~ ~ (
~







.                                     (5) 
 













, the optimal technology choice 
h c ~  determined by the domestic firm can be 
obtained from Equation (5). Equation (5) consists of three terms: the marginal cost of 
upgrading technological level is  T ¢ - , and the marginal benefit is 
h q ~  (the savings in 
production costs due to the better technology). The first term is the “strategic effect”, 
because  0 ~ >
f
c q , the term is therefore negative. Owing to technological improvement, the 
home firm can profit from the competition of the second stage; therefore, the strategic effect 
encourages the home firm to upgrade technology.   
By substituting 
h c ~  into 
h q ~  and 
f q ~ , and also substituting 
h q ~  and 
f q ~  into the 
inverse demand function, the domestic market price  p ~  under tariffs can be obtained.   
 
1. For details see Appendix I. CHEN: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS 
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2. Quotas 
 
Now  we solve the optimal output and technology level of the domestic firm under 
quotas. Let the policy maker commit to volume quota, the ratio quota and the sales quota as 
f q , r and v respectively. In order to compare with the tariff case, it is supposed that the 
magnitudes of quota happen to be equal to those when tariff stay in equilibrium. Namely, 
under the volume quota, 
f q =
f q ~ , under the ratio quota, r  =
f q ~ /
h q ~ , and under the sales 
quota 
f f h q q q p v ~ ) ~ ~ ( + = . These relationships could be also represented as  ) (
h f q H q = . 
In the second stage, the domestic firm will first choose the optimal output to maximize 
its profit under the volume quotas policy, hence the profit function of the domestic firm can 
be given as: 
 
[ ] ) ( )) ( ( )) ( , (
h h h h h h h h c T q c q H q p q H q - - + = p .                           (6) 
 
The first order condition of the above function is: 
 
0 ˆ ˆ ) 1 (
ˆ
= - + ¢ ¢ + =
h h
h c p q p H
dq
dp
.                                         (7) 
 
From Equation (7) we obtain the optimal quantity  ) , ( ˆ H c q
h h ¢  of the domestic firm under the 




H = ¢ . In the case of the volume quota where 
f q  is a constant, 







= ¢ . 
Substituting 
h q ˆ  into Equation (6), then the profit function can be described as 
 
[ ] ) ( ˆ )) ˆ ( ˆ ( ) ( ˆ
h h h h h h c T q c q H q p c - - + = p .                                   (8) 
 
In the first stage, the domestic firm determines the optimal technology level to 
maximize its profit. By using Equation (7) the first order condition for the above function 









.                                                   (9) 
 













, and according to the above first order condition, the optimal technology level of 
the domestic firm under quotas is 
h c ˆ . 
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3. The Price Equivalence between Tariffs and Quotas 
 
From the previous two sections we have obtained the optimal output and technology 
level separately under the tariff and the quota policies. The next to be discussed is the price 
equivalence between tariffs and quotas. 
Substituting the first order condition of the domestic firm under quota (i.e., Equation 
(9)) into the first order condition under the tariff (i.e., Equation (5)), we obtain 
 














h + - + - - =
= p
p
,                                     ( 10) 
 
where  p ~  and 
f
c q ~ are both constants in the case that 
h h c c ˆ = . If the sign of Equation (10) is 
negative (positive), it states that 
h c ~ is less (more) than 
h c ˆ , namely, the effect of 
technological improvement under the tariff is superior to that under quota. Hereinafter we 
discuss respectively the sign of Equation (10) and the price equivalence between tariffs and 
quotas according to the significance of each quota.   
 
a. Volume Quota 
 
According to the previous suppositions, the import volume under the volume quota 
should be equal to that under tariffs, vaz. , ~ f f q q =   and the domestic output,  ) , (
f h h h q c q q = , 
should be identical with the output when tariffs are levied (namely 
h h q q = ~ ),
2 hence 
Equation (10) can be rewritten as: 
 
0 ~ ) ~ (
0
ˆ















.                                           (11) 
 
2. It is not possible to use the first order conditions in Equations (3) and (7) to obtain directly the short equations for 
the optimal outputs 
h q ~  and 
h q ˆ of the domestic firm respectively under tariffs and quotas and to compare the 
magnitudes of both, however, from the supposition that the profit function is concave, by substituting 
h q ~ and 
f q ~ into the marginal profit function under the quota, and by use of the first order condition under the tariff, one 
can obtain 
 
0 ˆ ˆ )) ( , ( ˆ
~
~















From the above equation it can be found that when keeping constant at the same  
h c , the magnitude of both are 
related to  H ¢ : (I) for the volume quota, since  H ¢ = 0, the outputs of the domestic firm respectively under tariffs 
and quotas are identical. (II) for the sales and the ratio quota, since  H ¢ > 0, then the optimal outputs of domestic 
firm under these two cases are less than the one under the tariff.  CHEN: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS 
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where 
h c   is the technology level of the domestic firm under the volume quota. Since the 
value of Equation (11) is less than zero, it can be understood that 
h h c c < ~ , which states that 
the technology level determined under the tariff is better than the one chosen under the 
volume quota. The reason is that under the volume quota the foreign firm has a fixed output 
and the domestic firm can not exert an influence on the import volume by means of choosing 
a better technology choice, 
h c is higher (i.e., losing the strategic effect mentioned in some 
references). As a result, the incentive for the domestic firm to improve its technologies is low. 
On the other hand, substituting 
h c ~ and 
h c  into Equation (3)
3 it can be shown that 
since 
h c ~ < 
h c  and 
h
c q ~ <0 the output of the domestic firm under the tariff is higher than 
under the volume quota (i.e., ) , ( ) , ~ ( ~ t c q t c q
h h h h > ). Therefore, the total output (Q
~
) in the 





.                                                            (12) 
 
By Equation (12) it can be deduced that the domestic market price ( p ~ ) under the tariff 
is less than the price ( p ) under the quota limit. Thus, the price equivalence does not stand, 
as shown in Equation (13). 
 
p p < ~ .                                                            (13) 
 
These relations can also be shown in Figure 1, in which point “A” is the equilibrium 
under a supposed tariff, the domestic and the foreign goods is respectively 
h q ~  and 
f q ~ , the 
reaction curve of the domestic firm is RF
h. Since it has been supposed that the volume quota 
f q is equal to the optimal output 
f q ~ under the tariff, so the reaction curve of the foreign 
firm becomes the straight line 
f q
f q in the Figure 1. Since 
h c ~ <
h c , it can be seen from 
Equation (3) that the reaction curve of the domestic firm has a larger intercept under the 
tariff, i.e., the reaction curve of the domestic firm under the volume quota moves inward to 
RF
h’, in which case the balance point is “B”. By comparing “A” with “B” the above result 
can be obtained. 
 
b. Ratio Quota 
 
Similarly, the output and the technology choice of the domestic firm under the ratio 
quota can be supposed respectively to be 
h q )  and 
h c )
. Since Equation (10) is still less than 
zero, it states that the technology choice of the domestic firm under the tariff is better than 
under the ratio quota (namely 
h c ~ <
h c )
). By the same deduction, it can be shown that 
 
3. on the supposition that  ) , ( ~ t c q q
h f f = , the connotations of Equations (3) and (7) are the same, therefore, the 
domestic technology choice under the volume quota can be substituted into Equation (3) to conduct a comparison. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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h q ) <
h q ~ . Let the foreign volume under the ratio quota be 
f q ) , to keep the ratio r a constant, 
there must be 
f q ) <




is respectively the total output 







, so  p p
)
< ~ .                                                  (14) 
 
The above equation states that under the ratio quota the market price will be higher 

















Figure 1   The Reaction Function and Output for Tariff and Quota   
 
c. Sales Quota 
 
With regard to the case under the sales quota, it can also be obtained from the result in 
Equation (10) that the technology choice under the tariff is promoted higher than under the 
ratio (
h c ~ <
h c & ), and the output under the ratio quota is smaller than under the tariff (
h q & <
h q ~ ). 
In analysis of the price equivalence, when the output of the domestic firm under the sales 
quota is lower than under the tariff, for keeping the constant market sales of imports, there 
might be two possibilities. First, the domestic market price goes up and the import volume 
goes down. Second, the domestic market price goes down and the import volume goes up. 
Both the cases spoil the price equivalence. Although we can not evaluate both 
f q & and 
f q ~  
and further to compare domestic market prices under the sales quota and under the tariff, it is 
highly possible that the price equivalence of tariff and value quota is not held. 
In contrast, Hwang and Mai (1988) assume that technology exogenously, accordingly, 
it can be found that the price equivalence between tariffs and quotas can hold (see Table 1). CHEN: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS 
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In this paper, if we take technology exogenously, we could also obtain the price equivalence.
4 
Otherwise, the domestic market price under the volume and the ratio quota is higher than 
under the tariff. In the case of the sales quota, it depends according to the market demand 
condition. The domestic market price under such case is either higher or lower than under the 
tariff, but not equal to. These results are also listed in Table 1. 
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Note: Values in parentheses are results under technological exogenously, also the results of Hwang and Mai (1988). 
* Indicates the domestic firm’s conjectural variation under quota is equal to tariffs case, then 
h h q q ~ = , the 
Cournot case leads to equivalence. 
 
IV. Comparison of Tariffs and Quotas in Technology Progress 
 
The results in this paper can be used not only in analysis of the price equivalence 
between tariffs and quotas, but also in comparison of the technology progress effects under 
various quotas. For one thing, let us compare the  technology progress effects under the 
volume quota and the market share quota. B y using Equation (9), and substituting 
0 ) , ( = ¢ - ¢ - T H c q
h h ) ) , the first order condition under the ratio quota, into the first order 
 
4. In such a case, as shown in f ootnote 2, for the volume quota, since  H ¢ = 0, the outputs of the domestic firm 
respectively under tariffs and quotas are identical, therefore the price equivalence is hold. For the value and the 
ratio quota, since  H ¢ > 0, then the optimal outputs of domestic firm under these two cases are less than the one 
under the tariff. However, if we allowed for other types of behavioral conjecturals in this model, the domestic 
firm’s reaction function under tariffs becomes:   
 




h f h h q
dq
dq
p c p q q p                                                 (3¢ ) 
 
    We are now to compare the output by the domestic firm under quota and under the equivalent tariffs. To examine 















q H q d
h h
= ¢ = ¢ - ¢ =
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Namely, if the domestic firm’s conjectural variation under quota is equal to tariffs case, then
h h q q ~ = , the 
Cournot case leads to equivalence. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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condition under the ratio quota, it can be obtained
5 that 
 
0 ) , ( ) , (
0
< ¢ + - =
=
H c q q c q
dc









.                                   ( 15) 
 
The above equation less than zero states that 
h h c c ) < , i.e., the technology progress effect 
under the volume quota is superior to under the ratio quota. 
Similarly, substituting the first order condition under the sales quota into the first order 
condition under the volume quota, it can be got that 
 























.                                     (16) 
 
The sign of Equation (16) will be maintained indefinitely if the ratio of the outputs of the two 








= ), then Equation (16) is zero. This 
tells us that both the quotas exert same effect on the technology upgrade. However, when the 
ratio of the two output changes is more than the ratio of the two outputs, the sign of Equation 
(16) will be negative, which shows 
h h c c ) & > . This result means that the technological 
upgrading effects under the ratio quota is better than under the sales quota.
6 Contrarily, the 
effect under the ratio quota is worse than under the sales quota. 
According to the analysis above, it can be seen that the best technological upgrading 
effect happens under tariffs, and next under volume quota. While, the effects under the ratio 
and the sales quota depend on the output ratio and the output change ratio between the 
domestic and the foreign firms. The interpretation of above is that, under tariffs the quantity 
of foreign-supplied goods will not be limited, therefore, the domestic firm is confronted with 
a larger market competitive pressure. In addition, the existence of the strategic effect can 
induce the domestic firm to improve its technologies to restrain the import volume. With 
these two factors, technological upgrading effect under the tariff is the best. 
In the case of the volume quota, the domestic firm has no way of limiting the import 
volume, that is, little incentive to enhance its technologies level. Finally, under the market 
share quota and the sales quota, as an effect of the domestic technological progress, the 
domestic output increase, and on the supposition that all the quota are binding, the foreign 
output will simultaneously increase at the same ratio or at the same change ratio. Thereby, 




5. For details see Appendix II. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Tariffs and quotas have been since beginning of the 20
th century the most commonly- 
used trade protection tools, thus there have been many references in the research on the price 
equivalence problem. Since the motive behind trade protection is often to improve the 
technology standard of the domestic firm and enhance its competence, so it shall be more 
meaningful to discuss the price equivalence problem from the point of view that the choice 
of technology level is endogenous. 
Through the above analysis it is found that if the technology level is endogenous, then 
the domestic market price under the tariff is lower than under the volume and the ratio quotas, 
but it may be either higher or lower than the price under the sales quota. In any case, the 
price equivalence is not guaranteed in general.   
In addition, through investigation of the four protection policies it is found that for 
promotion of technologies the tariff policy is the most evident means, next is the volume 
quota. On the while the technological upgrading effects under the ratio and the sales quota 
depend on the output ratio and the output change ratio between the domestic and the foreign 
firms. The above results can be summarized as follows: 1) under tariffs, the domestic firm is 
confronted with a larger market competitive pressure, hence it has relatively the more the 
incentive to improve its technologies; 2) under the volume quota, the domestic firm cannot 
limit the import volume by determining a better technology level, thus the technological 
upgrading effect under this policy is worse than under the tariff; 3) under the ratio and the 
sales quotas, the output increase caused by the domestic technological progress allows the 
import volume to increase at the same ratio or at the same change ratio and thus the 
technological upgrading effects of the domestic firm are the worst. 
Here is suggested some policy implications. If a government pays more attention to the 
welfare of domestic consumers, the tariff policy should be adopted since the domestic market 
price is lower than under the volume quota. If a government pays more attention to the 
domestic technological upgrading effect, then the first to be adopted is the tariff policy, and 





By a totally differential of the first order condition, the influence of the domestic 
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Appendix II 
 
In order to compare the quantities of domestic firms under the volume and the ratio 
quota, the supposition that a profit function should be concave can be used. Substituting 
f h q q , into the marginal profit function under the ratio quota, and using the first order 
condition under the volume quota we get: 
 
0








f q f q







q H q d ¶ p
.                                   ( A2) 
 
Since the above equation is less than zero, it can be concluded that the optimal 
quantity under the volume quota is larger than that under the ratio quota. 
Similarly, by substituting the FOC under the ratio quota into the FOC under the value 
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= .                               (A3) 
 
By this time if the domestic and foreign quantity change ratio is larger than the quantity ratio, 
Equation (A3) will be less than zero, which states that the domestic quantity under the ratio 
quota is higher than that under the sales quota. Using the same method, it can be obtained 
that the optimal quantity under the sales quota is less than that under the volume quota. The 
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